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Separable games
LAURA ARDITTI, GIACOMO COMO, FABIO FAGNANI
We present the notion of separable games, which refines and generalizes that of graphical games. We prove
that there exists a minimal splitting with respect to which a game is separable. Moreover we prove that in every
strategic equivalence class, there is a game separable with respect to the minimal splitting in the class. This
game is also graphical with respect to the smallest graph in the class, which represent a minimal complexity
graphical description for the game. We prove a symmetry property of the minimal splitting of potential games
and we describe how this property reflects to a decomposition of the potential function. In particular, these
last results strengthen the ones recently proved for graphical potential games. Finally, we study the interplay
between separability and the classical decomposition of games proposed by [5], characterizing the separability
properties of each part of the decomposition.
1 INTRODUCTION
Graphical games (see [9] and [1, Chapter 7]) are games equipped with a network structure among
players that specifies the pattern of dependence of their utilities. More precisely, in a graphical
game players are identified with the nodes of a graph and the utility of each player depends only
on her own action and the action of players that correspond to her neighbors in the graph.
They have recently become prominent as a unifying theory to study the emergence of global
phenomena in socio-economic networks like peer effects, technology adoption, and consensus
formation [8]. They are also a natural model in engineering and computer science to describe the
interaction of multi-agent systems and a powerful tool to design distributed algorithms [6].
While there is already a large amount of literature focusing on specific graphical games (e.g.
coordination and anti-coordination games), it is still missing a general theory. How the graphicality
of a game reflects on its properties is still largely unexplored. A remarkable exception is constituted
by the papers [12] and [3], where the authors independently prove that a potential graphical game
admits a potential reflecting the graphical structure, precisely, one that can be decomposed as a
sum of terms defined on the maximal cliques of the graph.
The contribution of this paper is threefold. First of all, we study graphical games up to the so
called strategic equivalence, meaning that we are only concerned with variations of the utility of a
player when he modifies its action rather then their actual values. This is typical in technological
contexts where the game rather then an intrinsic model is the result of an explicit design. All
classical solutions (such as domination, Nash equilibrium, correlated equilibrium) are preserved
under strategic equivalent transformations. Also, classical evolutionary dynamics associated to
games like the best-response dynamics or the log-likelihood dynamics are invariant with respect
to this equivalence. Second, we consider a refined version of the concept of graphicality, called
separability, that takes into consideration the way utility functions decompose as sum of functions
only depending on specified subsets (separations) of neighbors’ actions. This generalizes the concept
of pairwise graphical games (like majority games) (cf. [4, 7]), also called polymatrix games (cf. [14]),
where the utility of each player i is representable as the sum of atomic utilities of 2-players games
only depending on the action of i and the action of one of her neighbors. Finally, we focus on a
classical decomposition of games in terms of non-strategic, potential and harmonic parts introduced
in [5]. An analysis of some strategical aspect of such decomposition has been carried out in [2]
where authors point out some drawback of it and propose a generalization to overcome those issues.
In our work, instead, we undertake a fundamental analysis on how such concepts interact with the
separability of a game.
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We present three fundamental results that are Theorem 1, Theorem 2 and Theorem 3. In Theorem
1 we prove that in any strategic equivalence class of games there exists a game that is separable with
respect to a minimal splitting and consequently graphical with respect to a minimal graph. This
game has a simple expression and satisfies a certain normalization condition. Theorem 2 concerns
potential games. It asserts that the minimal splitting considered in Theorem 1 must satisfy in this
case a symmetry property and that the potential admits a minimal decomposition with respect
to the corresponding separation. This, in particular, implies, and in fact refines, the result in [3].
Our result also implies the Hammersley-Clifford theorem, a classical result for Markov random
fields [10, Chapter 3]. Theorem 3 regards the way the decomposition in non-strategic, potential and
harmonic components reflects the separability of a game. While the non-strategic part is always
separable with respect to the same splitting (and then graphical with respect to the same graph)
than the original game, the same is not true in general for the potential and harmonic parts that
are instead separable with respect to a larger splitting, and then graphical with respect to a larger
graph where out-neighbourhoods have become cliques. Intuitively, this means that there are short
range hidden strategic interactions which involve only players that directly influence the utility of
some common player in the original game. This “interaction enlargement” not always happens
and we show that for the important class of pairwise graphical games (where utility of players
is the sum of utilities of 2-players games played with their neighbors) actually the potential and
harmonic components maintain the original graphicality. We present explicit examples of where
this phenomenon shows up.
In the remaining part of this section, we present some background and notational assumptions
that will be used throughout the paper. In Section 2 we present graphical games. Section 3 is
devoted to the introduction of the concept of separable game with respect to a given splitting,
to the discussion of its relation with graphical games and to the presentation of few explicative
examples. In Section 4 we study the question of the minimal splitting with respect to which a game,
or a game up to strategic equivalence, is separable. Main result of this section is Theorem 1 that
also discusses the minimality of the corresponding graphical representation. Section 5 is devoted
to potential games and contains the main result of this paper that is Theorem 2. It consists of a
complete analysis of the minimal splitting of a game, the minimal separability of its potential and of
the relation between them. A discussion of how this result relates to Hammersley-Clifford theorem
is finally presented. In Section 6 we analyse the interplay between the classical decomposition
of games and their separability. The main result of this section is Theorem 3, which provides a
general characterization of the separability property of each component. Corollaries 4 and 5 instead
characterize the components of a G-game and a pairwise separable G-game respectively, which
correspond to the two extreme cases of the weakest and the strongest separability possible for a
G-game. The paper ends with a conclusive section and an appendix where a technical lemma on
separable functions is proven.
1.1 Background and notation
A (directed) graph G = (V, E) is the pair of a finite node set V and a link set E ⊆ V × V ,
whereby a link (i, j) ∈ E is meant as directed from its tail node i to its head node j. We will
consider graphs containing no selfloops, i.e., that (i, i) < E for every i ∈ V and we shall denote by
Ni = {j ∈ V : (i, j) ∈ E} andN•i = Ni ∪ {i} the open and, respectively, closed out-neighborhoods
of a node i in G. The intersection of two graphs G1 = (V, E1) and G2 = (V, E2) with the same
node setV is the graph G1 ∩ G2 = (V, E) where E = E1 ∩ E2. We shall say that G1 = (V, E1) is a
subgraph of G2 = (V, E2) (equivalently that G2 is a supergraph of G1) if E1 ⊆ E2. Note that we
shall consider undirected graphs as a special case where (i, j) ∈ E if and only of (j, i) ∈ E. For an
undirected graph G, we denote by C(G) the family of cliques of G. Finally, we introduce the symbol
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⪯ to denote the element-wise inclusion of two families of sets, i.e., for two familiesU = {Ui } and
V = {Vj },U ⪯ V means that
∀Ui ∈ U , ∃Vj ∈ V : Ui ⊆ Vj .
The binary relation ⪯ defines a preorder over families but not an order. Indeed it is reflexive,
transitive but not antisymmetric.
2 GRAPHICAL GAMES
Throughout the paper, we shall consider strategic form games with finite nonempty player setV
and finite nonempty action set Ai for each player i inV . We shall denote by X =∏i ∈V Ai the
space of all players’ strategy profiles and, for every player i inV , let X−i = ∏j ∈V\{i }Aj be the
set of strategy profiles of all players except for player i . As customary, for a strategy profile x in
X, the strategy profile of all players except for i is denoted by x−i in X−i . We shall refer to two
strategy profiles x and y in X as i-comparable and write x ∼i y when x−i = y−i , i.e., when x and y
coincide except for possibly in their i-th entry. Let each player i inV be equipped with a utility
function ui : X → R . We shall identify a game with player set V and strategy profile space X
with the vector u assembling all the players’ utilities. Notice that, in this way, the set of all games
with player setV and strategy profile space X, to be denoted byU, is isomorphic to the vector
space RV×X .
A game u is referred to as non-strategic if the utility of each player i inV does not depend on
her own action, i.e., if
ui (x) = ui (y) , ∀x ,y ∈ X s.t. y ∼i x . (1)
The set of non-strategic games will be denoted byN and it constitutes a linear subspace ofU. Two
games u and u˜ are referred to as strategically equivalent if their difference is a non-strategic game,
i.e., if
ui (x) − u˜i (x) = ui (y) − u˜i (y) , ∀x ,y ∈ X s.t. y ∼i x . (2)
Strategical equivalence is in fact an equivalence relation on games andwe shall denote the strategical
equivalence class of a game u by [u]. A game u is referred to as normalized if∑
y∼ix
ui (y) = 0 , ∀x ∈ X, i ∈ V . (3)
The normalized version of a game u is the game u ∈ U with utilities
ui (x) = ui (x) − 1|Ai |
∑
y∼ix
ui (y) , ∀x ∈ X, i ∈ V . (4)
It is then easily verified that the game u is both normalized and strategically equivalent to u. In
fact, u is the unique normalized game in the strategic equivalence class [u]. [5, Lemma 4.6.]
A class of games that play a key role in the theory are potential games [11]. A game u ∈ U is
referred to as an (exact) potential game if there exists a potential function ϕ : X → R such that
ui (x) − ui (y) = ϕ(x) − ϕ(y) , (5)
for every player i ∈ V and every pair of i-comparable strategy profiles x ∼i y in X. Graphical
games [9] are defined imposing suitable restrictions on the way utilities depend on the strategy
profiles. Precisely, a game u is said to be graphical on a graph G = (V, E) (or, briefly, a G-game) if
the utility of each player i inV depends only on her own action and the actions of fellow players
in her neighborhood in G, i.e., if
ui (x) = ui (y) , ∀x ,y ∈ X s.t. xN•i = yN•i . (6)
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(a) Graph of the
normalized potential
game in Example 1.
(b) Graph of the
game in Example 2.
(c) Graph of normal-
ized version of the
game in Example 2.
Fig. 1. Graphs of the games for Examples 1–2
2.1 Minimal graph of a game
Notice that if a game u is graphical with respect to two graphs G1 = (V, E1) and G2 = (V, E2), it
is also graphical with respect to their intersection G1 ∩ G2. Since every game is trivially graphical
on the complete graph onV , we can conclude that to each game u inU one can always associate
the smallest graph on which u is graphical. We shall refer to such graph as the graph of the game u
and denote it as Gu .
Example 1. Consider a game with three playersV = {1, 2, 3}, binary action spaces Ai = {−1, 1}
for i = 1, 2, 3, and utility functions
u1(x) = x1x2 , u2(x) = x2(x1 − x3) , u3(x) = −x3x2 . (7)
It is then straightforward to verify that this is a normalized potential game with potential func-
tion ϕ(x) = x1x2 − x2x3 . Notice that for this game Gu is an undirected graph with link set E =
{(1, 2), (2, 1), (2, 3), (3, 2)} (see Figure 1a).
Example 2. Consider a game with player set and actions spaces as in Example 1 and utility functions
u1(x) = x1x2 + (1 − x1)x2x3 , u2(x) = x2(x1 − 2x3) + (x2 + 1)x1x3 , u3(x) = x1x2 . (8)
In this case Gu is the complete graph of order 3 displayed in Figure 1b. The normalized version u of u
has utilities
u1(x) = x1x2(1 − x3) , u2(x) = x2(x1 − 2x3 + x1x3) , u3(x) = 0 . (9)
Its graph Gu has link set E = {(1, 2), (1, 3), (2, 1), (2, 3)} and is displayed in Figure 1c. Notice that,
albeit the normalized game u is strategically equivalent to u, in this case Gu ⊊ Gu is a strict subgraph.
3 SEPARABLE GAMES
In this section, we present a notion of separable game (Section 2) that refines and generalizes that
of graphical game. The definition we adopt is an extension of the one introduced by Papadimitriou
and Roughgardern in [13] under the name of hypergraphical games, in that we admit directed
hypergraphs while the aforementioned authors implicitly restrict to the undirected case. Except for
some minor technicalities our definition coincides with the one proposed by Ortiz and Irfan [12]
for the class of graphical multi-hypermatrix games, though the authors do not point out explicitly
the underlying hypergraphical structure.
First, we introduce the notion of separability for function as follows.
Laura Arditti, Giacomo Como, Fabio Fagnani 5
Definition 1. Given a family J = {Jk }k of subsets ofV , a function f : X → R is J -separable
(equivalently, J is a separation for f ) if there exist functions дk :
∏
j ∈Jk Aj → R, for Jk ∈ J , such
that
f (x) =
∑
k
дk (xJk ) , ∀x ∈ X , (10)
i.e., if f (x) can be decomposed as the sum of functions дk (xJk ) each depending on a subset Jk ⊆ V of
the players.
Now, let Si = {Si,h}1≤h≤ki be a family of subsets ofV , for every player i inV . We shall refer
to the array of such families S = {Si,h}i ∈V,1≤h≤ki as a splitting. Then, we have the following
definition of separability for a game.
Definition 2. Given a splitting S = {Si,h}i ∈V,1≤h≤ki , a game u is S-separable if the utility of
each player i inV is Si -separable, i.e., if it can be decomposed as
ui (x) =
ki∑
h=1
uhi (xSi .h ) , (11)
where, for 1 ≤ h ≤ ki , uhi :
∏
j ∈Si,h Aj → R is a function that depends on the actions of players in
the subset Si,h only.
This definition not only describes that interactions in the game are local but it also captures
the fact that players may have separate interactions with different groups of their neighbours.
This grouping on the player set is described by the splitting. In particular, for each player i the
separation Si represents a grouping ofV from the viewpoint of i . This is a key difference between
our definition of separable game and the notion of hypergraphical game presented in [13]. Indeed,
while the splitting structure is able to collect and combine the different viewpoints of all players,
the hypergraphical one specifies a single global grouping ofV on which all players agree.
Observe that separability of a game is both a generalization and a refinement of the notion of
graphicality. Indeed, every S-separable game is graphical on the graph G(S) = (V, E), whereby
each node i inV has neighborhood Ni = ⋃kih=1 Si,h \ {i}. On the other hand, for a given graphG = (V, E), every G-game is S-separable where S = {Si }i ∈V is the splitting with ki = 1 and
Si = {N•i } coinciding with the closed out-neighborhood of node i in G, for every i inV .
In fact, important classes of graphical games have finer separability properties than the afore-
mentioned trivial one. In particular, for a given graph G = (V, E), a pairwise-separable network
game (cf. [4, 7]) on G is such that the utility of player i ∈ V can be decomposed in the form
ui (x) =
∑
j ∈Ni
ui j (xi ,x j ) ∀x ∈ X , (12)
where ui j : Ai ×Aj → R for i, j ∈ E. These games are also known as polymatrix games on G [14].
Notice that the utilities in (12) clearly define a G-game. In fact, such a game can be interpreted as
one in which the players are located at the nodes of the graph G whose links are to be interpreted as
two-player games between their endpoints (with the convention that uji (x j ,xi ) = 0 for every link
(i, j) ∈ E whose reverse is not a link, i.e., such that (j, i) < E). Every player i ∈ V can chose a unique
action xi ∈ Ai to be used in all games she simultaneously participates in and gets a utility that is the
aggregate of the utilities from all her outgoing links. Clearly, a pairwise-separable network game
with utilities as in (12) is S-separable with respect to the granular splitting S = {Si,h}i ∈V,1≤h≤ki
where, for i inV , Si,h = {i, jh} for 1 ≤ h ≤ ki where ki is the degree of node i andNi = {jh}1≤h≤ki
is the neighborhood of node i in G.
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Example 3 (Network coordination game). Relevant examples of pairwise-separable network
games can be constructed by combining the 2-player coordination games, which are described by the
following utility functions.
u12(x1,x2) =
{
1 if x1 = x2
−1 if x1 , x2
, u21(x1,x2) = u12(x1,x2). (13)
The coordination game is an example of symmetric 2-player game with binary actions. Notice that it
is normalized and potential. Given an undirected graph G we construct a pairwise-separable graphical
game where each pair of adjacent players is involved in a coordination game. In this way we obtain
the well known majority game, which is used to model the behaviour of a population of conformist
agents whose social interactions are described by G.
Example 4 (Best-shot public good game). Consider a graph G and the game where every player
i inV has binary action set Ai = {0, 1} and utility:
ui (x) =

1 − c if xi = 1
1 if xi = 0 and x j = 1 for some j ∈ Ni
0 if xi = 0 and x j = 0 for every j ∈ Ni .
The game u constructed in this way is the so called “public good game”. It models a more complex
behaviour for the population V : players benefit form acquiring some good, represented by taking
action 1 and which is public in the sense that it can be lent from one player to another. Taking action 1
has a cost c , so players would prefer that one of their neighbors takes that action, but taking the action
and paying the cost is still the best choice if no one of their neighbors does. The public good game is a
graphical game on G and it is separable with respect to the splitting S where for every node i , ki = 1
and Si = {N•i }.
4 MINIMAL REPRESENTATIONS OF GAMES
In this section we discuss the existence of minimal representations for games. In Section 4.1 we
show that every game admits a minimal splitting with respect to which it is separable. Finally,
in Section 4.2 we show that a normalized game is separable on the finest possible splitting and
graphical on the smallest possible graph in its equivalence class.
4.1 Minimal splitting of a game
Recall that in Section 2 we defined the graph Gu of the game u as the minimal graph G such that u
is a G-game. We define now a corresponding concept for splittings.
Definition 3. A splitting S for a game u is said to be minimal if for any splitting S˜ of u it holds
S ⪯ S˜ ,
that is, if for every i ∈ V , Si ⪯ S˜i , and if each separation Si only contains maximal sets.
This definition describes the fact that a minimal splitting for a game is finer than any other
splitting the game admits, in the sense of the preorder relation ⪯. However, ⪯ doesn’t distinguish
between families possessing the same maximals sets, meaning that if A ⪯ B, than also A˜ ⪯ B for
any family A˜ with the same maximal sets as A. This is exactly the reason why ⪯ does not induce
an order relation over splittings, but only a preorder, and as a consequence the minimal splitting
of a game may not be unique. Definition 3 addresses this point by requiring that each separation
of a minimal splitting is an independent set, i.e., it only contains maximal elements. By avoiding
redundancy in the minimal description, the minimal splitting is always unique.
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However, it is less trivial to see that the minimal splitting of a game always exists, as we will
show in this subsection.
First, notice the following general fact about separation of functions. Clearly, if a function f is
A-separable, then it is also separable with respect to the family of maximal sets of A (with respect
to inclusion). Moreover, for two families A and B of subsets ofV , let A ⊓ B be the family
A ⊓ B := {C = A ∩ B| A ∈ A, B ∈ B} .
Then, the following fundamental result holds true, as proven in Appendix A.
Lemma 1. If a function f is both A-separable and B-separable, then it is also C-separable for
C = A ⊓ B.
Notice that the family A ⊓ B is a finer separation that both A and B, namely A ⊓ B ⪯ A and
A⊓B ⪯ B. Then, Lemma 1 allows us to prove the following result guaranteeing the existence of the
minimal splitting of a game and showing that the minimal graph of a game is the one associated to
that splitting.
Proposition 1. Let u be a game. Then, there exists a minimal splitting Su = {Si,h}i,h with respect
to ⪯ such that u is Su -separable. Moreover
Gu = G(Su ) (14)
where G(Su ) is the graph with node setV and where for every i ∈ V the neighborhood of player i is
Ni (Su ) =
⋃
h
Si,h \ {i} .
Proof. Lemma 1 ensures that the family of splittings of a game u is closed under the intersection
⊓. In particular, consider a game u which is separable with respect to two spittings S1 = {Bi }i ∈V
and S2 = {Di }i ∈V , where Bi and Di are separations of ui . Then Lemma 1 directly implies that u is
separable with respect to the splitting S = {Si }i ∈V where Si = Bi ⊓ Di , which is finer than S1
and S2 with respect to ⪯. Together with the fact that every game is trivially separable with respect
to the splitting S = {Si }i with Si = {V}, this implies the existence of finest splittings for u with
respect to ⪯. Finally, the fact that if a utility function ui is Si -separable, then it is also separable
with respect to the separation of maximal sets of Si implies a corresponding property for games,
so that there exists a finest splitting Su for u such that each separation Su,i is an independent set.
This proves the first claim.
To prove the inclusion Gu ⊂ G(Su ) it is sufficient to show that u is graphical on G(Su ). This
follows from the fact that u is Su separable. Indeed we have that for every i ∈ V
ui (x) =
∑
h
uhi (xSi,h )
so thatui only depends onN•i (Su ). To prove the remaining inclusion G(Su ) ⊂ Gu observe that since
u is a Gu -game, then it is separable with respect to the splitting S˜ = {S˜i }i ∈V where S˜i = {N•i }
and Ni denotes the out-neighborhood of i in Gu . Since Su is minimal, Su ⪯ S˜ , that is
∀i ∈ V,∀h, Si,h ⊂ N•i .
This implies that Ni (Su ) ⊂ Ni , that is G(Su ) ⊂ Gu . □
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4.2 Minimal splitting of a strategic equivalence class
As illustrated by Example 2 in Section 2, two strategically equivalent games u and u˜ might have
quite different graphs Gu and Gu˜ . Indeed, it is easy to see that every game u admits a strategically
equivalent game u˜ such that Gu˜ is the complete graph. Analogously, strategically equivalent games
can have quite different separability properties.
It is not obvious whether a strategic equivalence class [u] always contains a game whose graph
is minimal and whose splitting is the finest in the class. This property turns out to hold true, as a
consequence of the following result.
Theorem 1. Let u be an S-separable game. Then its normalization u is separable with respect to
the splitting S¯ ⪯ S such that
S¯i =
{Si,h : i ∈ Si,h} .
Moreover, for the minimal splitting Su of u, S¯u is minimal for u¯, i.e. Su¯ = S¯u ⪯ Su . Finally, Gu ⊂ Gu .
Proof. Let the game u have utilities satisfying (11). Then, for i inV and 1 ≤ h ≤ ki , observe
that the quantity
ni,h(xSi,h\{i }) =
1
|Ai |
∑
y∈X:
y∼ix
ui,h(ySi,h )
depends only on the actions of players in Si,h \ {i}. Then, define a new game u∗ with utilities
u∗i (x) =
ki∑
h=1
u∗hi (xSi,h ) , u∗hi (xSi,h ) = uhi (xSi,h ) − ni,h(xSi,h\{i }) , (15)
for every player i inV and strategy profile x in X.
Now, notice that, since the terms ni,h(xSi,h\{i }) do not depend on the action xi of player i , the
game u∗ defined by (15) is strategically equivalent to u. We show that each u∗hi satisfies∑
y∈X:
y∼ix
u∗hi (ySi,h ) =
∑
y∈X:
y∼ix
(
uhi (ySi,h ) − ni,h(ySi,h\{i })
)
=
∑
y∈X:
y∼ix
(
uhi (ySi,h )
)
− |Ai |ni,h(ySi,h\{i }) = 0 .
Then, by linearity, u∗ is normalized. But since there exists just one normalized game u in the
strategic equivalence class [u], this shows that u∗ = u. Moreover, notice that if i < Si,h , then
ni,h(xSi,h ) = uhi (xSi,h ). Then from (15) we have that u∗hi , 0 only if i ∈ Si,h , so that u is separable
with respect to S¯ . Finally, assume that S is minimal for u, i.e. S = Su . To show that S¯ is minimal for
u¯, we call S˜ the minimal splitting of u¯ and we show that S¯ ⪯ S˜ . Recall that since u is strategically
equivalent to u¯ we have
ui (x) = vi (x−i ) + u¯i (x)
= vi (x−i ) +
∑
k
u¯hi (x S˜i,k ) .
for some function vi depending only on x−i . The last shows that a separation for ui is given by{
V \ {i}, S˜i,k
}
k
.
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Since by assumption Si is the minimal separation for ui , we have that ∀Si,h ∈ Si , either i < Si,h
or Si,h ⊂ S˜i,k for some k . Equivalently, if i ∈ Si,h (which by definition means that Si,h ∈ S¯) then
Si,h ⊂ S˜i,k for some k . This shows that S¯ is minimal for u¯.
To conclude the proof, notice that by Proposition 1 we have Gu = G(S) and Gu¯ = G(S¯). Since by
construction S¯ ⪯ S , it holds G(S¯) ⊂ G(S) so Gu¯ ⊂ Gu . □
Corollary 1. Let u be a game and u be its normalized version. Then,
Su ⪯ Su˜ and Gu ⊆ Gu˜ (16)
for every strategically equivalent game u˜ ∈ [u].
Proof. It follows immediately from Theorem 1 and the fact that the normalized version of any
strategically equivalent game u˜ ∈ [u] coincides with the normalized version u of u. □
Corollary 1 implies the existence of a game, the only normalized game u¯ in [u], that is simultane-
ously separable with respect to the intersection
S[u] = ⊓
u˜ ∈[u]
Su˜
of the minimal splittings of all the strategically equivalent games in the class [u] and graphical on
the intersection
G[u] =
⋂
u˜ ∈[u]
Gu˜
of the minimal graphs of all the strategically equivalent games in the class [u]. In fact, the graph
G[u] = Gu
may be interpreted as the minimal topological complexity needed to represent a game in the class
[u], namely a game up to non-strategic equivalence.
5 ON THE STRUCTURE OF POTENTIAL GAMES
In this section we focus on potential games and derive our main result Theorem 2 and Corollaries
2–3, which improve the existing results about the structure of potential functions and games.
As anticipated by Examples 1 and 2, the minimal graph associated to a game can be either
directed or undirected. Corollary 2 shows that this is not the case when we restrict to normalized
potential games, which only exhibit undirected minimal graphs and thus are characterized by
symmetry of interactions between players. Theorem 2 is an extension of this result, showing that
the symmetry of interactions in normalized potential games concerns not only binary but also
higher order interactions.
To make this formal, we first introduce the following definition.
Definition 4. A splitting S is said to be symmetric if for all i ∈ V and Si,h ∈ S we have that
j ∈ Si,h =⇒ ∃h′ : Sj,h′ = Si,h (17)
Then, point (1) of Theorem 2 tells that the minimal splitting of normalized potential game is
symmetric, meaning that if the utility of a player i depends jointly on the actions of players j and
k in the minimal splitting, than j and k are jointly dependent on each other and on i . This first
structural result allows us to characterize the separability properties of the potential function and
to describe the relation between the minimal splitting and the minimal graph. In particular, point
(2) shows how the minimal splitting of a normalized potential game is connected to the minimal
separation of its potential function. Then, in point (3) we deduce the relation between minimal
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splitting and minimal graph and thanks to point (2) we are able to translate this property to obtain
a corresponding result on the potential function.
Theorem 2. Let u be a normalized potential game with potential ϕ. Denote by S the minimal
splitting of u and by T the minimal separation of ϕ. Then
(1) S is symmetric,
(2) T =
⋃
i ∈V Si and ∀i ∈ V : Si = {T ∈ T : i ∈ T } ,
(3) S ⪯ C(Gu ) and T ⪯ C(Gu ).
Remark 1. Point (3) of Theorem 2 implies the result of [3] on the structure of the potential and of
the utility functions in graphical games. Indeed, the characterization of potential function of graphical
potential games proposed in [3] directly follows from point (3), as we characterize the minimal
separation of ϕ. Similarly, the characterization of the utility functions proposed in [3] can be directly
obtained from point (3) by exploiting that u is strategically equivalent to its normalization u¯ and by
the fact that Gu¯ ⊂ Gu . The result we propose is actually stronger than the one of [3], since we don’t
just show that one possible splitting of u can be constructed with the cliques of Gu , but instead we show
that every set in the minimal splitting of a normalized potential game is a clique of Gu . Moreover, our
proof is essentially self-contained and, in contrast to [3], it does not rely on the HammersleyâĂŞClifford
theorem.
Remark 2. In fact, Theorem 2 implies the HammersleyâĂŞClifford theorem. To see this, for any
positive probability distribution P on X that satisfies the Markov property on an undirected graph
G, let ϕ(x) = logP(x). Then, upon interpreting ϕ as the potential of a normalized potential G-game,
Theorem 2 implies that P(x) = exp(ϕ(x)) factorizes on the cliques of G.
Proof of Theorem 2. Proof of point (1). As a first step, we prove one side of the inclusion in
(17):
j ∈ Si,h =⇒ ∃h′ : Si,h ⊆ Sj,h′ . (18)
By hypothesis u is S-separable, i.e.,
uj (x) =
∑
h′
uh
′
j (xSj,h′ ) .
u is strategically equivalent to the gameuϕ , where every player’s utility coincides with the potential
function. As a consequence, we can express the utility of players i and j ∈ V in the form:
ui (x) = vi (x−i ) + ϕ(x)
uj (x) = vj (x−j ) + ϕ(x) =
∑
h′
uh
′
j (xSj,h′ ) .
By combining the two equations we obtain
ui (x) = vi (x−i ) −vj (x−j ) +
∑
h′
uh
′
j (xSj,h′ ) .
This shows that ui admits the following separation:
S˜i =
{V \ {i},V \ {j},Sj,h′} .
Laura Arditti, Giacomo Como, Fabio Fagnani 11
Since S is minimal, Si must be a finer separation that S˜i . In particular, Si,h must be contained in
some element of S˜i . Then one of the following inclusions must be satisfied
Si,h ⊆ V \ {i}
Si,h ⊆ V \ {j}
Si,h ⊆ Sj,h′ for some h′.
The first inclusion is false, since it follows from Theorem 1 that the minimal splitting S of a
normalized game satisfies i ∈ Si,h for all i and h. The second inclusion is also false since by
assumption j is contained in Si,h . Then the last is true, which proves (18). To conclude the proof,
observe that
j ∈ Si,h =⇒ ∃h′ : Si,h ⊆ Sj,h′
=⇒ ∃h′ : i ∈ Sj,h′
=⇒ ∃h′′ : Sj,h′ ⊆ Si,h′′
=⇒ Si,h ⊆ Si,h′′ .
Since S contains only maximal sets, we deduce that h′′ = h and Si,h = Sj,h′ .
Proof of point (2). Denote by split(T ) the splitting obtained from T by setting
split(T )i = {T ∈ T : i ∈ T }
and denote by join(S) the separation obtained by the splitting S as
join(S) =
⋃
i ∈V
Si .
First, notice that ϕ is separable with respect to join(S). Indeed, for every player i , we can write
ui (x) =
∑
h
uhi (xSi,h ) = vi (x−i ) + ϕ(x)
for some function vi , and this shows that for every i ∈ V , ϕ is separable with respect to{Si,h ,V \ {i}}h . (19)
Since T is the minimal separation for ϕ, T is finer than the separation in (19) for each i . This means
that ∀i ∈ V and ∀T ∈ T , either T ⊂ Si,h for some h or T does not contain i . Since T is non
empty, we can consider j ∈ T and we have T ⊂ Sj,k for some k . This shows that for all T ∈ T ,
T ∈ ⋃i ∈V Si , i.e., ϕ is separable with respect to join(S). Moreover, observe that u is separable with
respect to split(T ). This simply follows from the fact that, since u is normalized, we have
u = u¯ϕ ,
i.e., u coincides with the normalization of the game where each player has utility equal to the
potential function ϕ. So each utility function uϕ,i is trivially separable with respect to T and by
Theorem 1 its normalization ui is separable with respect to split(T )i . Comparing the minimal
splitting S with split(T ), we clearly have that
S ⪯ split(T )
where ⪯ stands for pointwise inclusion of sets. Moreover, both S and split(T ) are symmetric
splittings (the former by construction, the latter by point (1)). This implies that
join(S) ⪯ join(split(T )) = T
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u ϕ
T = join(S)
S = split(T )
minimal splitting S minimal separation T
Fig. 2. Graphical representation of the relation between the minimal splitting S of normalized potential game
u and the minimal separation T of its potential function ϕ.
but since T is by assumption the minimal splitting for ϕ, this implies
join(S) = T , (20)
which is the first part of the thesis. Moreover, from (20) we have
S = split(join(S)) = split(T ) ,
which concludes the proof. The result is represented in Figure 2.
Proof of point (3). By applying Proposition 1, we have that the minimal graph of u coincides
with the graph induced by the minimal splitting, that is G(S) = Gu . Since u is normalized, i ∈ Si,h
for every set Si,h ∈ S . Moreover, by point (1) Su is symmetric so we have that ∀i ∈ V , ∀h and
∀j,k ∈ Si,h , Gu contains the undirected link {j,k} and Si,h is a clique in Gu , even if not necessarily
a maximal one. This shows that S ⪯ C(Gu ). Since every set Si,h is a clique in Gu , point (2) implies
that also T =
⋃
i ∈V Si only contains cliques of Gu , so that T ⪯ C(Gu ). □
Another simple but relevant consequence of Theorem 2 is the following result, showing that the
minimal graph of a normalized potential game is undirected. As previously mentioned, this fact
can be interpreted as a first order symmetry of the interactions among players. While this pairwise
symmetry is weaker than the higher order symmetry property of Theorem 2, it is significant since
it can be directly read on the minimal graph of the game.
Corollary 2. Let u be a normalized potential game. Then Gu is undirected.
Proof. Denote by S the minimal splitting of u. As a consequence of Proposition 1 Gu = G(S),
where G(S) is the graph induced by S . Since u is normalized, by Theorem 2 S is symmetric. This
implies that ∀i ∈ V , if j is a neighbor of i in Gu , i.e. j ∈ Ni , then j is in Si,h for some h and by
symmetry there exists h′ such that i ∈ Sj,h′ . Then i ∈ Nj , that is, i is a neighbor of j in Gu . □
Corollary 3. Let u be a pairwise-separable network potential game. Then u admits a pairwise
separable potential function with minimal separation
ϕ(x) =
∑
{i, j }∈E
ϕi, j (xi ,x j )
where E is the set of the undirected links of the graph Gu .
Proof. Without loss of generality we can assume that u is normalized. Since u is pairwise-
separable, every set Si,h in the minimal splitting S of u contains exactly two elements, one of which
is i . By Proposition 1, Gu = G(S), which means that every set Si,h ∈ S corresponds to a link of
Gu , which is undirected per Corollary 2. By applying point (2) of Theorem 2 we obtain that ϕ has
minimal separation T =
⋃
i ∈V Si = E. If u is not normalized, we can apply the above procedure to
u¯, which is still a pairwise-separable game with the same potential function ϕ. □
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Fig. 3. Graph of the normalized harmonic game in Example 6.
6 DECOMPOSING GRAPHICAL GAMES
6.1 Classical game decomposition
Another class of games that play a key role in the theory are harmonic games [5]. A game u ∈ U is
referred to as harmonic if ∑
i ∈V
∑
y∼ix
[ui (x) − ui (y)] = 0 , (21)
for every strategy profile x ∈ X. Notice that a normalized game is harmonic if and only if∑
i ∈V
|Ai |ui (x) = 0 , ∀x ∈ X . (22)
Hence, in particular, if the action sets of all players have the same cardinality |Ai | = a, then a
normalized game u is harmonic if and only if it is a 0-sum game, i.e.,∑
i ∈V
ui (x) = 0 , ∀x ∈ X . (23)
Example 5 (Anticoordination and discoordination games.). We already introduced the
2-player coordination game in Example 3. Similarly, we now introduce the 2-player binary anticoordi-
nation game, with utility functions
u12(x1,x2) =
{
−1 if x1 = x2
+1 if x1 , x2
, u21(x1,x2) = u12(x1,x2) (24)
and discordination games, which is described by the following utility functions
u12(x1,x2) =
{
+1 if x1 = x2
−1 if x1 , x2
, u21(x1,x2) = −u12(x1,x2) (25)
where x1,x2 ∈ {0, 1}.
Anticoordination games is a symmetric potential game. Discordination game, instead, does not
admit any potential, as it does not have Nash equilibria. It can be verified that it is an harmonic game.
Notice that both games are normalized.
It has been proven in [5, Theorem 4.1.] that the space of games can be decomposed as a direct
sum
U = N ⊕ P ⊕ H , (26)
where P is the space of normalized potential games, N is the space of non-strategic games,H is
the space of normalized harmonic games. In other terms, (26) means that every finite game can be
decomposed in a unique way as the sum of a nonstrategic game, a normalized potential game, and
a normalized harmonic game.
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Fig. 4. A directed graph G.
Example 6. Consider a game with player set and actions spaces as in Example 1 and utility functions
u1(x) = −x1x2x3 , u2(x) = x2x3(x1 − 1) , u3(x) = x3x2 . (27)
It is then easily verified that this game is a zero-sum normalized game, hence a harmonic game since all
action sets have the same cardinality. The graphGu of this game has link set E = {(1, 2), (1, 3), (2, 1), (2, 3), (3, 1)},
hence it is not undirected, and is displayed in Figure 3.
Notice that the game of Example 2 game can be decomposed as u = uN + uP + uH , where uN is a
is non-strategic game with utilities
uN,1(x) = x2x3 , uN,2(x) = x1x3 , uN,3(x) = x1x2 ,
uP is the normalized potential game with utilities as in (7), and uH is the normalized harmonic game
with utilities as in (27). In particular, the normalized version u of u has utilities as in 9 and graph Gu
as in Figure 1c. Notice that, in spite of the fact that u can be decomposed as u = uP + uH , neither the
graph GuP of the normalized potential component (Figure 1a) nor the graph GuH of the normalized
harmonic component (Figure 3) are subgraphs of Gu .
6.2 Decomposition of separable games
In this section, we shall state our result concerning the decomposition of graphical games into their
non-strategic, potential, and harmonic components.
Certain supergraphs of a graph G = (V, E) will play a relevant role in our analysis: they are all
undirected and obtained by keeping the same node setV and augmenting the link set E as follows.
First, let G↔ = (V, E↔) be the minimal undirected supergraph of G. Clearly, G↔ is obtained
from G by making all its links undirected, i.e., it has link set E↔ = E ∪ {(j, i) : (i, j) ∈ E}.
Moreover, let G△ = (V, E△) be the graph obtained from G↔ by adding links between every pair
of outneighbors of every node, i.e., G△ has link set
E△ = E↔ ∪
⋃
i ∈V
{(j, l) : j , l ∈ Ni } .
We will also consider suitable enlargements of splittings according to the following definition.
Definition 5. For a given splitting S = {Si,h}i ∈V,h we define the symmetrized version of S as the
splitting S∗ such that ∀i ∈ V
S∗i = Si
⋃{
S j,h ∈ S |i ∈ S j,h
}
. (28)
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Observe that S∗ is by definition a symmetric splitting. Actually, it is the smallest symmetric
splitting which contains S , i.e., such that S ⪯ S∗. In particular, if S is symmetric, then S∗ = S .
We start with the following result that is a simple consequence of [5, Theorem 4.1] that will
nevertheless prove very useful in proving our main result of this section.
Lemma 2. For i ∈ V andW ⊆ V \ {i}, let Vˆ = {i} ∪W and let G = (V, E), where E = {(i, j) :
j ∈ W} be a directed star graph with center i and leave setW. Let u ∈ U be any normalized G-game
with playersV such that uj ≡ 0, ∀j , i . Then, u can be decomposed in a unique way as
u = uP + uH ,
where uP and uH are, respectively, normalized potential and normalized harmonic games that are
graphical on the Vˆ-clique G△. Moreover, uP admits potential function ϕ : X → R such that ϕ(x)
depends on xVˆ only.
Proof. Let Uˆ be the space of games with player set Vˆ and strategy profile space Xˆ =∏i ∈Vˆ Ai .
Then, define the game uˆ ∈ Uˆ as the restriction of u to the player set Vˆ . Notice that uˆ is normalized,
so that by [5, Theorem 4.1] it can be decomposed uniquely as uˆ = uˆP + uˆH where uˆP ∈ Uˆ is
normalized potential with potential function ϕˆ : Xˆ → R and uˆH ∈ Uˆ is normalized harmonic.
Let then uP ∈ U and uH ∈ U be the extensions of uˆP and uˆH , respectively, obtained by defining,
(uJ)i (x) = (uˆJ)i (xVˆ) and (uJ)k (x) = 0 for J ∈ {H ,P}, i ∈ Vˆ , and k ∈ V \ Vˆ . Then, notice that
bothuP anduH are normalized G△-games. Moreover,uP is a potential game with potential function
ϕ(x) = ϕ(xVˆ), while uH is a harmonic game. Finally, u = uP + uH so that, by the uniqueness
of the decomposition, uP and uH are the normalized potential and harmonic components of u,
respectively. □
We are now ready to state and prove the following, that is our main result providing a refinement
of the one in [5].
Theorem 3. Let u ∈ U be a finite game with minimal splitting S . Then u can be decomposed as
u = uN + uP + uH , (29)
where
• uN is a non-strategic S-separable game;
• uP is a normalized potential S¯∗-game admitting a potential function ϕ : X → R that can be
decomposed as
ϕ(x) =
∑
i ∈V
∑
h
ϕi,h(x S¯i,h ) ; (30)
• uH is a normalized harmonic S¯∗-game.
Moreover, G(S¯∗) = (V, ES ) where
ES = E↔ ∪
⋃
i ∈V
⋃
h
{
(j, l) : j , l ∈ Si,h \ {i}
}
(31)
where E is the link set of Gu = G(S) = (V, E).
Observe that the graph G(S¯∗) is obtained from Gu by making all existing links undirected and
by adding an undirected link between every couple of players belonging to a common group in S .
It is then clear that G(S¯∗) defines a more general notion of extension of Gu than the ones
previously introduced.
Indeed, notice that G↔u and G△u are special cases of G(S¯∗). In particular G(S¯∗) = G↔u when
the game u has minimal splitting S¯ such that for every node i , ki = |Ni | and S¯i,h = {i, jh} for
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(a) Construction of
G↔u .
(b) Construction ofG△u . (c) Neighboorhood
of node i in G(S¯∗).
Colours represent two
groups Si,h ∈ S . The
construction must be
repeated for every
node.
Fig. 5. Supergraphs of the graph Gu represented in Figure 4.
1 ≤ h ≤ ki , where Ni = {jh |1 ≤ h ≤ ki } is the neighborhood of i in Gu . Similarly G△u = G(S¯∗)
when ki = 1 and S¯i,1 = N•i . This fact is illustrated in Figure 5.
Proof. Let u ∈ U be a game and S = {Si,h} i∈V,
1≤h≤ki
be its minimal splitting. First, assume that
the game u is normalized so that by Theorem 1 for every i ∈ V we have i ∈ Si,h ,∀h. We can
express the game u as a sum
u =
∑
i ∈V
∑
h=1
u(i,h) , (32)
where, for every i ∈ V and h, u(i,h) ∈ U is a normalized game with utilities
u(i,h)i (x) = uhi (xSi,h ) , u(i,h)j (x) = 0 , j , i , (33)
i.e, where all players apart from i have zero utility, while player i has utility uhi , equal to the utility
he gets from playing with the group Si,h . Clearly, each game u(i,h) satisfies the assumptions of
Lemma 2 withW = Si,h \ {i}, so that it can be decomposed as
u(i,h) = u(i,h)P + u
(i,h)
H , (34)
whereu(i,h)P andu
(i,h)
H are normalized potential and, respectively, harmonicG△(i,h)-gameswhereG△(i,h)
is the clique graph on Si,h . Also, by Lemma 2, u(i,h)P admits a potential function ϕ(i,h) depending
only on Si,h . Both games u(i,h)P and u(i,h)H only involve players in Si,h , whose utility depends only
Laura Arditti, Giacomo Como, Fabio Fagnani 17
on Si,h , i.e.
u(i,h)P, j = u
(i,h)
H, j = 0 if j < Si,h .
However, while inu(i,h) only player i has non-zero utility, in general foru(i,h)P andu
(i,h)
H all players in
Si,h have non-vanishing utility, i.e., for each k ∈ Si,h , u(i,h)P,k and u
(i,h)
H,k are not necessarily vanishing.
By combining (32) and (34) we then get that
u = uP + uH ,
where
uP =
∑
i ∈V
ki∑
h=1
u(i,h)P , uH =
∑
i ∈V
ki∑
h=1
u(i,h)H .
By linearity, uP ∈ P is a normalized potential game with potential function ϕ satisfying
ϕ(x) =
∑
i
∑
h
ϕ(i,h)(xSi,h )
whileuH ∈ H is a normalized harmonic game. Observe that not only the gamesu(j,h)P ∀h contribute
to the utility of a player j in uP , but also all games u(i,h)P with i and h such that j ∈ Si,h , i.e., we can
write
uP, j (x) =
∑
i,h:j ∈Si,h
u(i,h)P, j (xSi,h )
This shows that uP is S∗-separable, where S∗ is the symmetrization of S . The same reasoning shows
that also uH is S∗-separable.
Moreover, both uP and uH are graphical on the graph G∗ := ⋃i ∈V ⋃1≤h≤ki G△(i,h) with nodesV
and link set⋃
i ∈V
⋃
h
{(j, l) : j , l ∈ Si,h} = E↔ ∪⋃
i ∈V
⋃
h
{(j, l) : j , l ∈ Si,h \ {i}} = ES ,
with ES as defined in 31.
To conclude, we show that G∗ = (V, ES ) coincides with the graph induced by S∗, G(S∗). To see
this, denote by Ni the neighborhood of player i ∈ V in Gu = G(S) = (V, E),
Ni =
⋃
h
Si,h \ {i}
and by Ni (S∗) the neighborhood of i in G(S∗)
Ni (S∗) =
(⋃
h
Si,h
⋃{Sj,k ∈ S |i ∈ Sj,k }) \ {i} .
First we show that G∗ ⊂ G(S∗). Indeed, consider a link (i, j) of G∗ such that (i, j) ∈ E↔. Then either
(i, j) ∈ E or (j, i) ∈ E. If (i, j) ∈ E, j ∈ Ni so that j ∈ Si,h for some h. This implies that there exist
S∗j,k and S∗i,l such that i ∈ S∗j,k and j ∈ S∗i,l , which again implies that (j, i) and (i, j) are links of
G(S∗). We can proceed in the same way if (j, i) ∈ E.
Suppose instead that (j,k) is a link of G∗ such that j,k ∈ Si,h for some i , j,k and h. Then we
have that Si,h ∈ S∗j so that k ∈ Nj (S∗) and (j,k) is a link of G(S∗).
We prove now the opposite inclusion, that is G(S∗) ⊂ G∗. Consider a link (i, j) of G(S∗). We
have that j ∈ Ni (S∗), which implies that either j ∈ Si,h for some h or j ∈ Sl,k for some Sl,k with
i ∈ Sl,k . Now, if j ∈ Si,h then j ∈ Ni which implies that (i, j) ∈ E ⊂ ES . If instead j ∈ Sl,k with
i ∈ Sl,k , then i, j ∈ Sl,k with i , j and then (i, j) ∈ ES .
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Fig. 6. Representation of GuP and GuH for a public good game on G.
This concludes the proof for the case when u is normalized. For the general case when u may not
be normalized, just observe that one can write u = uN + u where u¯ is normalized and by Theorem
1 has minimal splitting S¯ = Su¯ , while uN ∈ N is a non-strategic S-separable game, thus graphical
on G(S) = Gu . □
Theorem 3 has a few important direct consequences that we discuss in the following.
First, observe that, for the minimal splitting S of u, we have by Theorem 3 that uP and uH are
graphical on G(S¯∗) ⊆ G△u , so that Theorem 3 directly implies the following.
Corollary 4. Every finite game u ∈ U can be decomposed as
u = uN + uP + uH ,
where
• uN is a non-strategic Gu -game;
• uP is a normalized potential G△u -game;
• uH is a normalized harmonic G△u -game.
Corollary 4 states that the minimal graphs GuP and GuH of the normalized potential and, re-
spectively, normalized harmonic components of a finite game u are subgraphs of G△u . As shown
in Figure 5b, in general G△u is a strict supergraph of Gu , which suggests that the nonstrategic-
harmonic-potential decomposition of finite graphical games may not preserve graphicality. In
fact, Corollary 4 allows for the possibility that the minimal graphs of the normalized potential
and normalized harmonic components of a finite game u include links between two players j and
k that are not direct neighbors in Gu but share a common in-neighbor i . While not influencing
directly their respective normalized utilities, such players j and k both directly influence the utility
of player i and this may result in the appearance of a link between them in the minimal graphs
of the normalized potential and normalized harmonic components of the game, as shown by the
following example.
Example 7 (Decomposition of the public good game). Consider the public good game defined
in Example 4 over a cycle graph with 6 nodes.
Figure 6 shows the minimal interaction graph Gu = G and the minimal graphs associated to the
potential and harmonic components. According to Corollary 4, they are both subgraphs of G△. In this
particular case they coincide with G△, showing that a sharper result cannot be obtained.
On the other hand, such possible links between common outneighbors of a single player in Gu
may not show up in the minimal graphs GuP and GuH of the normalized potential and normalized
harmonic components of the game. In fact, in the special case of pairwise-separable network games,
Theorem 3 reduces to the following.
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(a) Case I (b) Case II
Table 1. Representation of GuP and GuH for pairwise-separable graphical game on two different graphs G.
Corollary 5. Let u ∈ U be a pairwise-separable network game on a graph G = (V, E), with
utilities as in (12). Then, u = uN + uP + uH where
• uN is a non-strategic G-game;
• uP is a pairwise-separable normalized potential G↔u -game;• uH is a pairwise-separable normalized harmonic G↔u -game.
Observe that when u is pairwise-separable its potential and harmonic components are also
pairwise separable. Indeed, Theorem 3 implies that the potential function ϕ of uP is separable on
the undirected links of G↔u and therefore uP is pairwise separable as a consequence of Theorem 2
point (2). Then, by linearity also uH = u¯ − uP is pairwise-separable (since both u¯ and uP are).
Corollary 5 shows that for finite pairwise-separable network games the decomposition (26)
preserves the original graphical structure in that no link between players that were not directly
interacting in the original game shows up in either GuP or GuH . In fact, when G is undirected, we
have that G↔u is a subgraph of G so that we can simplify the result to deduce that uP and uH are
graphical with respect to G.
Example 8 (Decomposition of pairwise games). Consider an undirected interaction graph G
and construct a pairwise separable graphical game where each pair of adjacent players is involved
either in a coordination, an anticoordination or a discoordination game, as in Examples 3 and 5. Denote
by C , A, D the sets of pairs of players involved in a coordination, anticoordination or discoordination
game, respectively.
If we perform the decomposition according to Corollary 5, uN = 0 and we obtain that
• GuP contains the link {i, j} ∈ E if and only if {i, j} ∈ C or {i, j} ∈ A, i.e. if i and j are involved
in either a coordination or an anticoordination game;
• GuH contains the link {i, j} ∈ E if and only if {i, j} ∈ D, i.e. if i and j are involved in a
discordination game.
So in this case the graphs GuP and GuH can be determined by inspection and their link sets are disjoint.
In Figure 1 we report some example of decomposition. In particular we consider two topologies for G.
Red (blue) nodes indicate players who anticoordinate (coordinate) with their neighbors.
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In fact, Theorem 3 provides a characterization of the minimal graphs of the normalized potential
and normalized harmonic components of a finite game u. Such minimal graphs GuP and GuH are
contained in G(S¯∗), which is in general a subgraph of G△u and a supergraph of G↔u .
7 CONCLUSION
In this paper we have discussed separable graphical games. These are games where utility functions
decompose with respect to a certain splitting of the action variables. We have studied minimal
splitting of games and of games up to strategic equivalence.We have shown how, for potential
games, the interactions described the minimal splitting have a symmetric structure and the potential
function decomposes with respect to the corresponding minimal separation. Also, we have studied
the classical decomposition of a game into a potential and a harmonic part in the category of
separable games.
We believe that these fundamental results can be exploited in a variety of directions. Among the
issues, left for future research, we indicate
• the study of how such minimal splitting can be used to lower the implementation complexity
of distributed learning algorithms;
• the study of the implication of the decomposition of separable games in the field of evolu-
tionary dynamics. We expect that this, as for pure potential games, should have interesting
consequences.
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A PROOF OF LEMMA 1
Proof of Lemma 1. In the following we use the notation [n] to denote the set of the firstn natural
numbers, i.e., [n] = {1, 2, . . . ,n}. Consider the two separations A = {Ai }i ∈[l ] and B = {Bj }j ∈[m].
Define the binary set operator ⋉ whose action onA and B gives the setA⋉B, which contains all the
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intersections between elements of A and all the intersections of elements of A with elements of B:
A ⋉ B = {Ai ∩ Aj }i, j ∈[l ]
i,j
⋃
{Ai ∩ Bj } i ∈[l ]
j ∈[m]
. (35)
The proof is divided in two steps: in the first part, we show that if f is separable with respect to A
and B, then it is separable with respect to A ⋉ B; in the second part we show that by iteratively
joining A with B via ⋉ we obtain the separability of f on C .
Step one.
Fix any index s ∈ [l]. For all x we have
дs (xAs ) = −
l∑
i=1
i,s
дi (xAi ) +
m∑
j=1
hj (xBj ) (36)
= −
l∑
i=1
i,s
дi (xAi∩As ,x∗Ai \As ) +
m∑
j=1
hj (xBj∩As ,x∗Bj \As )
for any x∗ = (x∗1 , . . . ,x∗N ).
Indeed, since дs (xAs ) only depends on xAs , also the right side in (36) is independent of the values
of x outside As which can be arbitrarily fixed in a configuration x∗. Then for every i ∈ [l], i , s
and every j ∈ [m] we define
д(s,i)(xAi∩As ) = −дi (xAi∩As ,x∗Ai \As ) (37)
h(s, j)(xBj∩As ) = hj (xBj∩As ,x∗Bj \As ) (38)
so that we can write
f (x) =
l∑
s=1
дs (xAs )
=
l∑
s=1
l∑
i=1
i,s
д(s,i)(xAi∩As ) +
l∑
s=1
m∑
j=1
h(s, j)(xBj∩As ) . (39)
This shows that f is separable with respect to A ⋉ B. If A is a partition, we have that Ai ∩ Aj = ∅
for every i , j and (39) directly implies that f (x) = ∑k fk (xCk ) where for k = (s, j), fk = h(s, j) and
Ck = Bj ∩ As . In general, however, the intersections Ai ∩ Aj are non-empty.
Step two.
It follows from step one that f is separable with respect to A⋉B ⋉ · · ·⋉B, where the ⋉ operation
is performed an arbitrary number of times (⋉ associate to the left, so we omit the parenthesis). To
conclude the proof it is sufficient to show that, starting from A and iteratively applying ⋉B, we
reduce to a set which is element-wise included in C . In particular, we will show that
A⋉B ⋉ · · · ⋉ B︸         ︷︷         ︸
l times
⪯ C . (40)
To see this, observe that, by induction on n, we prove that for any n ∈ N
A⋉B ⋉ · · · ⋉ B︸         ︷︷         ︸
n times
⪯ {∩n+1k=1AIk } I⊂[l ]|I |=n+1⋃C (41)
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where
{∩n+1k=1AIk } I⊂[l ]|I |=n+1 is the collection of all intersections of n + 1 distinct elements of A. So, if
A contains l elements, the set A⋉B ⋉ · · · ⋉ B︸         ︷︷         ︸
l times
does not contain any member which is an intersection
of elements of A only. Indeed, as per (41),
A⋉B ⋉ · · · ⋉ B︸         ︷︷         ︸
l times
⪯
{
∩l+1k=1AIk
}
I⊂[l ]
|I |=l+1
⋃
C
= ∅ ∪C
= C .
In conclusion, this proves that f is separable with respect to C . □
